CULLODEN MOOR AND THE STORY OF THE BATTLE

THE BATTLE.

NOTICE of the approach of the Duke's army was brought to the Prince at Culloden House shortly before noon on Wednesday the 16th April, and he hurried to the Moor to put the battle in array. The call to arms had ever a charm for the Clans, and all within reach, some from as far as Inverness, hurried eagerly to the field, where they were cheered by the arrival of MacDonald of Keppoch with his men, and of a division of the Frasers numbering about 300. About an equal number under the Master of Lovat were on their way, but barely reached Inverness when they met the fugitives seeking safety in flight. Not above 5000 men mustered on this eventful day.

APPROACH OF THE DUKE'S ARMY

The English army had commenced to march as soon as the dawning day had enabled them to break their fast. Their course was directed along the south side of Kildrummie Moss, and thence by the range. of hillocks or ice-formed moraines between that and the north side of the Loch of the Clans and of Loch Flemington, and to the north of Dalcross Castle. They were ordered in three parallel divisions, each of five battalions of foot, with a fourth column of cavalry on the left, the artillery and baggage following on the right. They could thus at once be deployed into line.

 

The best means of matching the redoubled broadsword of the Highlanders, — whose mode of attack was, after a single discharge of their firearms, to throw these weapons aside and make a furious, and generally resistless, onset sword in hand — had occupied the anxious attention of military men for some time back, and the Duke gets the credit of a truly dexterous expedient. The soldiers of his army were instructed and enjoined, instead of each confining himself to his immediate opponent, to thrust with the bayonet at the adversary of his right-hand man. The point in this way, instead of being caught on the round target with which the clansmen were equipped on the left arm, holding at the same time a dirk in the left hand, would find an unprotected way to the sword-arm and right breast of the foemen, all unprepared to parry so unwonted a danger. Whether this specious manoeuvre was really practised to any extent in the deadly conflict does not appear. It may be fairly doubted whether men in a death-struggle could preserve sufficient presence of mind and mutual reliance to intrust every man his own well-being to the fidelity and promptness of his left-hand man. Besides, the swordsmen and firelock-men would not be pitted man to man, the former requiring more elbow-room. Still the lesson may, and is said in some instances to have done its effectual work. A more practical and efficacious instruction, carefully inculcated on the soldiers, was to reserve their fire till the attacking Highlanders should be close at hand. The following extract from the Duke of Cumberland's Orderly Book shows how closely he had studied the habits of those whom it was his lot to conquer, and marks also his contempt for the "Lowlanders and arrant scum," who, he asserts, sometimes made up the lines behind the Highlanders.

EDINBURGH, 12th January, 1745-6.

"Sunday parole, Derby. — Field-officer for the day; to-morrow, Major Wilson. The manner of the Highlanders' way of fighting, which there is nothing so easy to resist, if officers and men are not prepossessed with the lyes and accounts which are told of them. They commonly form their front rank of what they call their best men, or true Highlanders, the number of which being always but few. When they form in battalions, they commonly form four deep, and these Highlanders form the front of the four, the rest being Lowlanders and arrant scum. When these battalions come within a large musket shots or threescore yards, this front rank gives their fire, and immediately throw down their firelocks and come down in a cluster with their swords and targets, making a noise and endeavouring to pierce the body or battalion before them, — becoming twelve or fourteen deep by the time they come up to the people they attack. The sure way to demolish them is, at three deep, to fire by ranks diagonally to the centre, where they come, the rear rank first, and even that rank not to fire till they are within ten or twelve paces; but if the fire is given at a distance, you probably will be broke, for you never get time to load a second cartridge, and, if you give way, you may give your foot for dead, for they being without a firelock, or any load, no man with his arms, accoutrements, etc., can escape them, and they give no quarter; but if you will but observe the above directions, they are the most despicable enemy that are." (Memoirs of the Jacobites, by Mrs. Thomson, in Life of Cameron of Lochiel).

ORDER OF BATTLE.

When within about two miles of the Highland army, the Duke formed his troops in order of battle. But the others remaining in position, the column-formation and march were resumed, and by and by the advancing army again formed into line. The arrangement was highly approved by military authorities; there being three lines, the foremost composed of six regiments at short intervals, the second line of five regiments covering the open spaces and over- lapping the contiguous regiments in front, while four regiments in reserve formed a third line, which, in like manner, at the outset reached across the interstices of the second line. Each line was three deep. The several lines were respectively under the command of the Earl of Albemarle, General Huske, and Brigadier Mordaunt. Two regiments of dragoons, Lord Mark Kerr's, under Lord Ancrum's command, and Cobham's, headed by Generals Hawley and Bland, and accompanied by 3 portion of the Argyleshire Highlanders, and of such of Lord Loudoun's Independent companies as had joined (the rest of whom had charge of the baggage) were moved to the left, with an eye to a movement on the enemy's flank, and a body of horse was placed with the reserve. Eventually, however, the right wing becoming uncovered by reason of the recession of some marshy ground which had served to protect it, three of the reserve regiments were moved, one into the front and two into the second line, and the rest of the cavalry, Kingston's light horse and a troop of Cobham's, to the right flank. The portion of marshy ground in question is apparently what lies along a slight hollow, which from the west joins a more perceptible marshy hollow, in the course of the runlet percolating from the Well of the Dead, which, threading its way in a northerly direction, obliquely intersected the Duke's line of march. Two field- pieces, short 6-pounders, some of which had been got through this last-mentioned wet ground with difficulty, as the horses stuck fast and had to be unharnessed, and the guns dragged through by the soldiers, were placed in each of the front open spaces; while between the extreme regiments of the second line, as originally composed, there were batteries of three guns in each.

The Prince's army was marshalled in two lines, each also three deep, with a small reserve. There is considerable diversity in the order of arrangement of the component regiments as given by different writers, and on different plans of the battle — rather, however, as to the second line and reserve. The chief discrepancy as to the front line is, that some place John Roy Stuart's regiment in it, some in the second line; but the majority and most authoritative assign it a place in front, where, as a Highland regiment, it certainly ought to have been. In the front line were the Clans in the following order, reckoning from right to left:— The Athol Highlanders, Camerons, Stuarts of Appin, Frasers and Chisholms, MacIntoshes, MacLachlans and MacLeans, Farquharsons, John Roy Stuart's regiment, Clanranald, Keppoch and Glengarrv, MacDonalds and MacDonells. The second line, less numerous and compact, was most probably composed, we are inclined after careful consideration to conclude, in the same order, of two small squadrons of horse, — viz., Lord Elcho's Horse Guards and a moiety of Fitz-James's horse (possibly, however, in or a little behind the front line, where Home places the horse), Lord Lewis Gordon's regiment in column, Lord Ogilvie's, the Duke of Perth's, Lord John Drummond's French Royal Scots, the Irish Picquets or Brigade, and Glenbucket's regiment in column, with Lord Balmerino's Horse Guards on the flank. These were but a few incomplete troops of horse altogether; and Lord Strathallan's and Lord Pitsligo's horse, sometimes called the Perth Dragoons, with Lord Kilmarnock's small body of dismounted horse grenadiers, called foot guards, formed the reserve under Lord Kilmarnock; and with the Prince were the remainder of Fitz-James's horse. Some authorities substitute Lord Ogilvie's and the Duke of Perth's regiment for the reserve, and place the Perth Dragoons on the left of the second line. But the difficulty of mustering wherewithal to form a second line, seems conclusive against placing so considerable a body in reserve; and Home expressly states that the cavalry had so dwindled down that none of the horse, except Fitz-James's and the Horse Guards, formed part of either line. Lord George Murray commanded the right and the Duke of Perth the left wing, with Lord John Drummond in the centre of the front line; and the second line was under the command of General Stapleton. The field-pieces were placed four on either flank, and four in the centre.

The right wing of the Prince's army rested on the North Park dyke, to be distinguished from the Old Leanach dyke in continuation of it, and extending to the Graves' Clearing, and, there is reason to believe, continued along its south margin as far as the Well of the Dead. The Old Leanach dykes, which, from the east corner of the Park dyke, round by the east side of Old Leanach House, embraced an irregular area, shut in on the north, excepting partially towards the house, formed a boundary between the parishes of Croy and Daviot, the latter surrounding, or nearly so, this portion of the former; and the same zig-zag line, though now obliterated, is still the parish boundary. The old Park dyke also formed, though its site no longer forms, the boundary here between the counties of Inverness and Nairn. Browne, in his "History of the Highland Clans," is the only writer who seems pretty distinctly to have realised the existence and bearing of dykes other than what are called the park or enclosure dykes. He quotes (1850, vol. iii. p. 260) a letter of Lord George Murray's, addressed the day after the battle from Ruthven to the Prince — one of the Stuart Papers — in which he reflects on O'Sullivan, who arranged the order of battle, for a fatal error in allowing the enemy the walls on their left, which made it impossible, he says, to break them or prevent their flank-fire on the advancing Highlanders. Browne also adds, what we elsewhere notice as mentioned in the Lockhart Papers, that, while the Duke was forming his line of battle, Lord George Murray was very desirous to advance and throw down these dykes; but the attempt appeared too hazardous, and was not made. This must apply to the Old Leanach dykes, which dykes, in short, hampered, as much as the North Park dyke protected, the Highland right wing.

The position of both armies was operative rather for defence than offence. Hence the indisposition on either side to take the initiative in coming to close quarters. The right of the Highland front line seems to have stood opposite the east end of the North Park dyke, as represented in Home's plan of the battle, but must have been with an interval between, so as to stand clear of the interposing North Leanach dyke in front, and much about the line of the East Park dyke, which pointed directly to where the stables of Culloden House now stand. The left of the English front line would appear not to have advanced across the marshy hollow to the north of the Well of the Dead. Mr. Chambers says that the English army halted at a distance of 500 paces from the Highlanders, and that, after manoeuvring for half-an-hour with the view of outflanking each other, the two armies at last occupied nearly their original ground. The above relative positions are consistent with this statement and, considering the obliquity of the marshy hollow to the English line of battle, with Home's definition of the interval when, part of the ground having become soft and boggy, some of the artillery horses sunk — as 500 or 600 paces — all, of course, approximate calculations. The marshy hollow proceeding from the Well, however, runs away so much to the north, or east of north, that the mention made in the Duke's official report of the uncovering of his right wing by the discontinuance of a morass, must either have happened at a considerably greater distance from the Rebel army than 500 yards, as stated by him, or must have had reference to a different portion of the Moor, and seemingly, as has been said, to the smaller branch marshy hollow which joins the first from the west. Chevalier Johnstone says that the Highlanders descended with great rapidity into the marshy hollow, and charged sword in hand. On the other hand, the distance is certainly very considerable — the minimum upwards of 400 yards a long stretch for a rapid run, if sustained throughout, and sufficient to put even Highlanders out of breath: a consideration which points to the left of the English front line having been not far from the bottom of the marshy hollow, which is the more likely, in that the ground rises behind on the east more perceptibly than on the west side; so that, if farther back, they would have had an appreciable vantage ground, and the charge would have been in a measure uphill, circumstances calling for a notice which is not met with.

Tradition gives a position a little west of Old Leanach House to one of the English batteries, and associates with it the name of Colonel Telford, who had charge of the artillery; and this corresponds with the battery of three guns which, originally between the two extreme regiments, came, owing to Wolfe's regiment being advanced, to be quite on the left of the second line, which was much closer to — while it at first extended some what beyond, — the front line than that of the Prince's army. Home says that, when the battle began, the east dyke of the park or enclosure was within 150 paces of the dragoons; but, as they had no enemy confronting them, they night safely have been farther advanced than the infantry, and possibly so early, with a view of securing a hold on the Old Leanach north dyke, and in prosecution of the purposed flank- movement. Then a little way from the north end, the east dyke of the park projected in the direction of the dragoons. Wolfe's regiment, when on the extreme left of the second line, is said to have been up to the ankles in water. This would accord with a more advanced position for the first line, as the marshy ground near the well would satisfactorily explain it. Still the state of other parts of the ground is not to be judged by its condition now; so that the east side of the marshy ground there may be reasonably regarded as the position of the left of the English front line.

The long interval between the armies serves to account for the deadly losses sustained by the Highlanders in the charge, before closing man to man. Some writers allege very exaggerated spaces between the Highland lines. The second was, it may be assumed, at any rate not farther back than the line of the West Park dyke, more probably only about half way between that and the East Park dyke. From the west end of Old Leanach House is just about half- a-mile; and the combatants, excepting perhaps the reserves, were marshalled, it is believed, within these extreme limits. How far south the English front line extended is doubtful. There seems no reason for supposing it to have extended much if at all beyond the position of the present road at the crossing of the marshy hollow.

OPPOSING FORCES.

Mr. Chambers thus contrasts the appearance of the opposing forces, as represented in a print executed at the time:—

"The long compact lines of the British regiments, each three men deep, extend along the plain, with narrow intervals between; the two flags of each regiment rising from the centre, the officers standing at the extremities with their spontoons in their hands, and the drummers a little in advance beating their instruments. The men have tri-cocked hats, long coats resembling the modern surtout, sash belts from which a sword depends, and long white gaiters buttoned up the sides. The dragoons exhibit still more superfluity of attire; their long loose skirts flying behind them as they ride, while their trunk square-toed boots, their massive stirrup-leathers, their huge holster- pistols and carabines, give altogether an idea of dignity and strength much in contrast with the light fantastic hussar uniform of modern times." Of the Highlanders, dressed in the philibeg or kilt—

"All plaided and plumed in their tartan array," — he says:-

"They have muskets over their left shoulders, basket- hilted broadswords by their left sides, pistols stuck into their girdles, and a small pouch hanging down from their right loin, perhaps for holding their ammunition. By the right side of every piece of ordnance there is a cylindrical piece of wickerwork for the protection of the artillerymen, all of whom appear to wear kilts like the rest."

In the Mercury newspaper, published in Edinburgh on Tuesday, 27th May, 1746, a return is given, as handed about, of the officers and men in each of the 15 battalions of infantry on the day of battle, amounting to 5521. There were, besides, Lord Mark Kerr's and Lord Cobham's two regiments of dragoons, the Duke of Kingston's regiment of light horse, the Argyleshire Highlanders, and a detachment of Lord Loudoun's men, which had been shipped across the Firth — which would make the Duke's army, at the lowest computation, up to fully 7000 men, and the number has been stated as high as 9000; while of the Prince's there is no reason to doubt that not above 5000 could be got together. It is elsewhere stated that the latest returns previous to the battle, of the rank and file of the Royal army, showed the numerical strength to be 7179, which, with the proper allowance for commissioned and non-commissioned officers, would give an aggregate of about 8000, irrespective of the Militia and the portion of Lord Loudoun's Independent companies. The latter figure may therefore be pretty fairly assumed as the probable actual force on the field.

This great disproportion, and the distressing condition of the Mountaineers, worn out with fatigue and weakened with hunger, were again urged by Lord George Murray and the Highland chiefs as pressing reasons for retiring to the south side of the Nairn, for which there was still ample time, thereby enabling the men to recruit their energies, and affording opportunity for those on the march and the stragglers to join them. But the Prince was obdurate. The incidents of the previous night rankled in his breast. Distracted and hurried must have been the brief counsel taken at that eventful moment, and there were jealousies and dissensions among them. The Highland chiefs fought with a halter round their necks; while the French and Irish confidants of the Prince, in the service of France, felt assured, in case of a reverse, of the privileges of ordinary warfare; and they were behoved to be tired of the contest, and desirous to precipitate a crisis. Besides, we learn from the Lockhart Papers (vol. i. p. 444) that from the very outset

"a combination had been entered into against Lord George Murray (who, on his joining the Prince at Perth was declared Lieutenant-General) by John Murray the secretary, Mr O'Sullivan, and others. of which the Prince was acquented; but, being an active, sturring man, and well acquented with the situation of the country and people, he was caressed by the Prince, and had great weight in all the operations, notwithstanding the opposition he met with."

There were certainly good reasons for covering Inverness, had the means at command been adequate. The Prince had an overweening estimate of the irresistible prowess of the Highlanders, whom he had on all previous occasions seen victorious; but nothing short of supernatural strength could have enabled them, under the combined influences of want of sleep and food, and the fatigue of the untoward night-march, to cope with the fresh, well-appointed regulars who so far outnumbered them, and who, in complete battle array, approached in a cool, orderly, determined manner, presaging victory. On the other hand, the Rev. George Innes, Forres, in his Narrative says: "The men were nodding with sleep in the ranks " [of the Highland army]. Not a few were actually surprised after the battle, overcome with sleep, in the brushwood near Culloden House, and had their throats cut. It was nothing short of downright madness to venture such an issue.

THE CANNONADE AND MANOEUVING.

The Prince and the Duke rode along the lines, by words and gesture animating their respective troops. At the second halt, before moving forward his army in line, the Duke had addressed them in a speech of grave earnestness, befitting the momentous issues to his father's crown dependent on the conduct of the troops, as to which he could not fail to have misgivings, with Preston and Falkirk in fresh remembrance. The artillery on both sides commenced to fire a little after one o'clock; but that of the Highlanders was extremely ill-served and ill-pointed, and did little or no execution. Their ordnance was of very small calibre, none exceeding 4lbs. Many of the gunners had wandered with others in search of provisions, and had not returned, and their places had to be supplied by men unaccustomed to such practice, while the Duke's cannon made dreadful havoc.

Prince Charles had taken up a position behind, and a little to the right of, the right wing, on the farm of Culchuinag. A stone on which he stood is still pointed out. The position was pretty nearly in a direct line with the present north field fence, and about 150 yards from the west corner. While there he was bespattered with earth ploughed up by cannonshot, and one of his servants, holding a led horse, was killed. He then, it is believed, retired farther back, and took his stand, it has been said, at the farm-house of Balvraid, beside the ash tree already mentioned, from which the combatants would have been completely under the eye. That the Prince was at Balvraid, and standing beside the ash tree, seems from the tradition to be beyond doubt; but it is uncertain whether this may not have been merely during a pause in the retreat. Balvraid is rather too distant to be a very likely position, being three-fourths of a mile from his original one. In some accounts he is represented to have stood far behind his troops; but his exact whereabouts after removing from Culchuinag is uncertain. The Duke stood between the Royal Scots in the front and Howard's regiment in the second line of the right wing.

The object of both commanders seems to have been to try to induce the other to commence the attack, as also to gain the flank of their opponents. In this game the numerical superiority and better gunnery of the English gave the Duke the advantage in both particulars. Wolfe's regiment, which had been on the left of the second line, somewhat outflanking the first line, and up to the ankles in marshy ground, was brought forward and placed on the left by the Duke en potence that is, in advance and at right angles to the front line, so as to enfilade the enemy should they attack. As the hurricane of battle seems to have swept past without any injury to Wolfe's corps, it may be conjectured that their position was well back and south of the marshy hollow, where it adjoins the Well: where, too, they would be on slightly higher ground than the nearest combatants. The regiments from the reserve were also moved into the lines as already mentioned. Though the Highland right wing reached somewhat beyond Barrel's, the regiment on the extreme left of the front rank of the opposing troops, the English horse on both flanks extended beyond the Highland army. Not only so, but the Argyleshire, and some of Lord Loudoun's Highlanders, to the number of 140, the rest having been left in charge of the baggage, breaking down the eastern and western walls of the park enclosure, made a passage for the dragoons, who thus got and took up a position quite past the Highland right wing. It is obvious that this was west and south of a hollow of some little depth, which bends round the Culchuinag farmsteading on the east and north. James Macdonald, son of old James Macdonald, who lived at one time at Culchuinag, a sort of cicerone of the place, told the writer that in ploughing between the hollow in question and the road to the river, he turned up seven skulls at one time — proofs of the conflict which eventually took place at this spot. The tenant of Balvraid and Culchuinag, Lachlan Forbes, a person well advanced in years, whose father came to settle in Balvraid the year after the battle, also stated that his father told him the west wall was broken down some distance below the Culchuinag houses, quite as far or farther down than the Park houses, which would just serve to bring the troopers to the west and south side of the hollow; and it is to be supposed that they would have made a considerable detour in seeking the vantage-ground they thus gained. In the Lockhart Papers it is remarked, that the dragoons in their passage did not receive a shot from the battalion inside. This shows that they had kept well down the park. In the Mercury, 1st May, 1746, it is on the right flank of the second line the dragoons are said to have come, whick nearly corresponds with the above detail.

In connection with Culchuinag a singular incident occurred. The mother of the late old James Macdonald, the guide above mentioned, whose parents lived there, was baking on the day of battle, when a poor Highlander, who had lost his hand, rushed in and staunched the bleeding stump by thrusting it on the hot stones of the fire-place on the hearth.

To hold the dragoons in check, General Stapleton detached one of Lord Lewis Gordon's regiments, with the two squadrons of horse, on the right flank. The dragoons did not assail the right wing till the retreat had commenced.

THE CHARGE.

It was a great mistake on the Prince's part to leave the Highlanders, who had only partially become inured to such engines of destruction, so long exposed to the enemy's artillery, which seriously thinned their ranks. He ought at once to have allowed them the full benefit of their characteristic onset. The Highlanders were clamorous to be led to the charge. At length the Prince did send an aide- de-camp, a young man of the name of MacLachlan, with the requisite orders, but he was killed on the way by a cannon-ball. Colonel Ker of Gradyne mentions, in his account of the battle (Lyon in Mourning, i., 355), that he was sent by Lord George Murray to know if he should begin the attack, which the Prince accordingly ordered. He adds, "As the right was farther advanced than the left, Colonel Ker went to the left and ordered the Duke of Perth, who commanded there, to begin the attack, and rode along the line till he came to the right, where Lord George Murray was." By this time the wind, which blew from the north in the face of the clans, was accompanied by drifting snow. Other accounts represent Lord George to have yielded to the general wish, and to have ordered the charge without waiting for instructions. He did lead the right wing to the attack, but before he had well done so, the MacIntosh regiment broke out from the right centre, and rushed forward to close with the regiment opposite to them:— the Frasers, Stuarts, Camerons, and Athol Highlanders on the right, with the MacLachlans and MacLeans on the MacIntoshes' left, joined in the attack.

The interval between the opposing armies was greater at the north than at the south end, causing an obliquity in the line of attack, which pointed from the Highland left to the English left. But the MacIntoshes swerving to the right, partly to avoid the close fire of the 21st Scots Fusiliers (who themselves had only some half-a-dozen wounded), and of the field-pieces — partly, it is conjectured, from the formation of the ground, and the direction of an old roadway, and the clans becoming thus crowded together — the brunt of the conflict fell upon Munro's and Barrel's regiments, which occupied the English extreme left, the contending foemen feeling rather than seeing one another, owing to the density of the smoke. The dense massing together of the Clans which took place by the time they reached their foemen, is something remarkable, and must have greatly conduced to the carnage made among them before their favourite claymore came into play.

The onset of the Mountaineers is thus graphically described by Mr. Chambers:—

"It was the custom of the Highlanders before an onset to scrug their bonnets — that is, to pull their little blue caps down over their brows — so as to ensure them against falling off in the ensuing mélée. Never, perhaps, was the motion performed with so much emphasis as on the present occasion, when every man's forehead burned with the desire to revenge some dear friend who had fallen a victim to the murderous artillery. A Lowland gentleman who was in the line, and who survived till a late period, used always, in relating the events of Culloden, to comment with a feeling something like awe upon the more than natural expression of rage which glowed on every face and gleamed in every eye as he surveyed the extended line at this moment.